Zaman, M. Q. (2002) The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change (Princeton University Press)

Introduction
Representation of ulema as redundant, relic, etc
More focus on so-called Islamists, and "new intellectuals", and Shi'a ulema (following the 1979 Iranian revolution).
Zaman challenges such representations...
"...the 'ulama - their transformations, their discourses, and their religiopolitical activism - can ... only be neglected at the cost of ignoring or misunderstanding crucial facets of contemporary Islam and Muslim societies." (p.1)

Book draws on notions of (discursive) tradition developed by MacIntyre and subsequently Asad, with the 'ulema defined by "a certain sense of continuity" with a discursive tradition which "...constitutes the most significant difference between them and their modernist and Islamist detractors." Importance of studying ulema relates to "...the ways in which they have mobilized this tradition to define issues of religious identity and authority in the public sphere and to articulate changing roles for themselves in contemporary Muslim politics." (p.10)

Focus of Zaman's study: Deobandi "sectarian and doctrinal orientation" (p.11)

Madrasa founded in Deoband in the United Provinces (Doab region of Uttar Pradesh) in 1867.

Darululoom-Deoband official website.

Cf. work of Barbara Metcalf

• Social Science Research Council: "Traditionalist" Islamic Activism: Deoband, Tablighis, and Talibs

• Metcalf, B. (1982) Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband 1860-1900 (Princeton University Press)

"That the 'ulama wanted, in the immediate aftermath of the establishment of British rule in India, to focus on individual reform, on inculcating a renewed sense of personal responsibility as a way of coping with new challenges, is a central argument of Metcalf's work." (p.13)
But provides limited understanding of public/political dimensions that led to Pakistani sectarianism and the Taliban.

Builds on Metcalf's work. Other ulema studies: Eickelman (1985); Vogel (2000); Dhofier (1999); Binder, 1961.

Zaman's study "...aims to consider the important facets of religious change " of the contemporary 'ulama in both the colonial and postcolonial contexts, with reference to the Deobandi tradition in India/Pakistan, showing parallels with other ulema where possible, studying "...both the discourses and and the significance of their religiopolitical activism in their multifaceted relationship..." (p.14). Importance of understanding 'ulama for wider religiopolitical analysis of Islam.
 

Chapter 1: islamic Law and 'Ulama in Colonial India: A Legal Tradition in Transition

Idea that pre-modern islamic legal system as rigid = batty talk, with Schacht and Coulson topping the league of chatter-arses. These days, really smart folks read: Wael B. Hallaq (1995) Law and Legal Theory in Classical and Medieval Islam (London: Variorum), although whether words like 'medieval' are applicable to non-European history is a moot point!

The application of legal innovation (ijtihad) and adherence to past legal doctrines (taqlid) complex.

"...the discourse of even late medieval jurists bear ample testimony to continuous legal adaption and even innovation - that is, in effect, to the continuing practice of ijtihad. Their legal advances might be couched in the rhetoric of taqlid itself, but they are no less significant for being such." (p.18)
Taqlid might offer a wide range of potential rulings; plaintiffs interests might be guarded by transferring case to another law school; evidence of flexible relationship with existing juristic traditions.

Colonial Constructions of the Law and the 'Ulama

New legal system developed under the British India Company from 1772 onwards, , with "...the last vestiges of Islamic criminal law ceased to exists with the Penal Code (of Lord Macaulay) of 1862" (p.23), although muftis and pandits attached to British courts to advise judges on matters of personal law until 1864.
British instigated process of making specific set Muslim texts authoritative with regards to Muslim personal law.
"To the colonial officials, the very character of precolonial law and legal practice was uncertain, unsystematic, and arbitrary. Their own judicial practice was not much different..." (p.22)
"Yet even matters of personal status, the application of shari'a under colonial rule was far from uniform." (p.23)

Anglo-Muhammadan law

"How did this colonial legal discourse of authority, as embodied in a few fixed texts, affect the 'ulama's conception of the shari'a?" (p.23) Probably helped develop a more rigid conception of taqlid, aided by debates with ahl-i-hadith and the changing administration of administration of Islamic law. Codification allayed necessity of indigenous guides.

"...the new 'Anglo-Muhammadan law' was decidedly not the 'ulama's legal tradition, but a hybrid ... It also meant the 'ulama themselves were not part of this development. Historically, the most distinctive aspect of their vocation, the interpretation of the law, was effectively being removed from them." (p.25)

But if a judge were not available to issue fatwa, Deobandis insisted Muslims obey shari'a strictly (sometimes VERY, with women more often the site of contestation). Partly due to the legitimate importance of person-to-person contact with authorized (ijaza) person, or possibly, it may be that the ulama hoped to "bring pressure on the colonial administration" (p.28). Practice tended to be harder on women than men (and thus supported more by men who dominated public spaces), but women then sometimes resorted to apostasy, much to the 'ulama's alarm! However, this was challenged by a ruling from Mawlana Ashraf 'Ali Thanawi (d.1943), demonstrating that the 'ulama possessed "...resources within the Islamic legal tradition to bring about necessary change." (p.30). Thanawi also advocated use of committee of righteous individuals (jama'at-i-muslimin), although unclear the extent to this was utilised.

Late Colonial Politics and the 'Ulema

Under colonial rule, Shari'a became more 'content' than 'process' , at least in the Middle East: Brown, N. J. (1997) Sharia and State in the Modern Muslim Middle East, International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 29:3 pp.359-376
Not completely rigid in its codification.

Phenomenon of pro-Congress nationalist Mawlana Husayn Ahmad Madani and "...the implications for these 'ulama's understanding of the shari'a." (p.33).
Madani criticised by Iqbal and Mawdudi.
"Against Madani's view that Muslims and non-Muslims could be part of a single "nation" defined by territorial and other ties, Iqbal argued that religion was the sole basis of Muslim nationhood." (p.34)
Yet Madani's arguments illustrate the potential flexibility of Islamic legal thinking even within a context of contrary prevailing opinion and a tendency towards rigidification consequent of colonial oppression.
"Madani was evidently drawing on premodern juristic discourses in formulating his position on united nationalism, but there is no evidence that these discourses necessarily constrained him in the choices he made." (p.37)

"The ways in which the modern 'ulama have sought to preserve or enhance their influence in society ... are not reducible to a single or necessarily coherent position. That authority has been articulated in many different ways..." (p.37)
 

Chapter 2: Constructions of Authority

Commentary (shuruh):

• "One of the most distinctive facets of premodern 'ulema culture was the articulation of discourses through the medium of the commentary." (p38);

• Dialogue with authoritative text and scholarly tradition on the same;

• Preserved madhhab as well as permitting developments of the same;

• Medium of expression for juristic profession;

• Expounded meaning of Qur'an and Sunnah;

• Critical to philosophy (e.g. commentaries on Greek works);

• Far from being unique to Islam.

Commentaries often berated by post-Enlightenment European and even Muslim thinkers, eg. Fazlur Rahman, "sterile commentarial literature" whilst admiring their "ingenuity" (cited p.39, from Rahman, Islam and Modernity, 1982). Yet remains influential, e.g. Mawdudi and especially Qutb's: "In the Shade of the Qur'an" and also Muhammad Shahrur.

Deobandi - new emphasis on study of hadith in 19th training of 'ulama.
New commentaries written during the 19th and 20th centuries.

The Commentary as Polemic

Ahl-i-hadith
"...at the forefront of those writing and publishing on hadith in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries." (p.40)
Hadith commentaries as polemical tools to support one's own sectarian group and/or attack other groups.

Deobandi work par excellence - twenty-one volume I'la al-sunan (The Exultation of the Normative Practices [of the Prophet]) published between 1923-1982 by Mawlana Zafar Ahmad 'Uthmani. Includes refutation of Madani's united nationalism (although Madani isn't mentioned by name) strongly influenced by Ibn Taymiyya. Communal politics and fate of Urdu vs Hindustani major issue of time. Also, use of Arabic: Arabic writings "met the needs of sound polemics" and "may also have conformed to perceived colonial criteria of religious authority" (p.47) Ironically, in writing in defence of the Hanafi tradition, 'Uthmani assumes a position which is closer to the one held traditionally by the Maliki madhhab.

"Talal Asad's definition of "orthodoxy" as 'not a mere body of opinion but a distinctive relationship --  a relationship of power' elucidates  well 'Uthmani's conception of the Muslim community as essentially a political entity, whose survival requires power and political domination." (p.48)

"...commentaries are also produced in precise historical contexts that defines many of their specific concerns..." (p.49)

Eg. Muhammad Taqi 'Uthmani's Takmila to a treatise on Sahih Muslim's hadith published in context of Pakistani debates over Islamization: 1986-7

The "Presence" of the Master

Commentaries also start students' write ups of notes from their masters' lectures, some making little "contribution" in the traditional sense to the field. Often their apparent lack of "intellectual" significance has led to them (and the ulema) being ignored by researchers, who have failed to understand their proper cultural significance.

"Presence" extremely important - in premodern times, one reason why book studied in presence of author or under tutorship of properly trained scholar. The "presence" of various writers commenting in, on, and around prior works serves a similar purpose and lends authority to both the text and its tradition of scholarship.

Multiple Audiences

Printed texts
Wider range of writings available to a much more varied and larger audience. Undermined authority of 'ulema?
"The critical question ... is not whether their [i.e. the ulama's] authority has increased or decreased, but how that authority is constructed, argued, put on display and constantly defended." (p.55)

"...earlier forms of person-to-person transmission of learning have also persisted in the world of new media." (p.55)
E.g. Syrian scholar 'Abd al-Fattah Abu Ghudda - widely published but also numerous students spanning the Muslim world.

Religious public sphere
Islamist intellectuals like Mawdudi and Qutb have written commentaries for ordinary educated Muslims, and some of the 'ulama have done the same." (p.56)
E.g. Manzur Nu'mani Islam kiya hai? (What is Islam?) "As Eickelman and Piscatori have argued, such works exemplify the 'objectification of Muslim consciousness' whereby 'religion has become a self-contained system that its believers can describe, characterize and distinguish from other belief systems.''" (p.57)

Eickelman, D. F. and Piscatori, J. (1996) Muslim Politics (New Jersey: Princeton University Press)

Madrassas publish monthly magazine and ulema contribute articles to mainstream newspapers and magazines.
NB also: Mufti Muhammad Yusuf Ludhianawi, labelled a "media mufti" by Brinkley Messick.

"That the 'ulama write and publish extensively, but often separately, for both a learned, 'ulama audience ... shows ... that generalizations about the adverse impact of print on the 'ulama's influence and authority are suspect." (p.58) In fact, the ulema have long written for multiple audiences and print has not led to a 'priesthood of all  believers' as some commentators have feared (probably the same is true about the Net).

"Different kinds of texts help constitute authority in different ways..." (p.58)
 

Chapter 3: The Rhetoric of Reform and the Religious Sphere

"The modern state, colonial as well as postcolonial, has everywhere shaped "traditional" institutions and practices, not infrequently altering them beyond recognition, if not shaping them out of existence ... the most important and best-documented reform being that of the Azhar of Egypt." (p.60)

E.g. Moustafa, Tamir ( 2000) Conflict and Cooperation between the State and Religious Institutions in Contemporary Egypt, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Feb., 2000) pp.3-22, for how Al-Azhar gained more leverage over the government following Islamist violence in the 1990s.

See also:
Tunisia and the Zaytuna under French colonial rule; the Qarawiyyin and Yusufiyya in Morocco by the French in the 1930s.

Analysis of the reform of South Asian madrasas is important in that it indicates "...the emergence of new conceptions of religion. Initiatives towards reform, no less than the opposition to them, have fostered the view that religion occupies a distinct sphere in society. Such a conception of religion is distinctly modern, so far as Muslim societies are concerned. Yet it is striking that this conception is favoured by many 'ulama." (p.62)

Madrasa Reform: British Perceptions, Categories, Initiatives

"...to reform the local systems in view of their own perceptions, British colonial officials routinely invoked what to them were familiar and often self-evident concepts and categories..." (p.62)

MOST IMPORTANT NOTION: RELIGION

Asad argues concept of RELIGION led to the construction of "...a new historical object: anchored in personal experience, expressible in belief-statements, dependent on private institutions and practiced in one's spare time. This construction ... ensures that it is part of what is inessential to out common politics, economy, science and morality." (cited p.62)
Asad, T. (1993) Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam (John Hopkins University)

In one instance, ordering "indigenous" schools closed rather than allowing them to be under the authority of mosques. Closure of threat of closure of madrasas, particularly following the Mutiny of 1857, yet many still financed by govt. "However reform was conceived, the distinction between the religious and the nonreligious was central to that project." (p.61)

"...debates on madrasas as representing and guarding the 'religious' sphere in society ... are eminently modern debates with little precedent in medieval Islamic societies..." (p.64)

"Another fundamental category of colonial analysis in matters of education was the criterion of 'useful' instruction." (p.64)

Utilitarianism

"Orientalists" vs "Anglicists"
Debates "...over what constituted 'useful' knowledge was settled in the 1830s in favor of the 'Anglicists'" (p.65)
So-called 'useful' (beneficial) knowledge in medieval Muslim scholarship: al-'ilm al-nafi'. (includes knowledge that facilitates virtuous acts and thus assists towards salvation).
"The modern 'ulama's defense of madrasa education as 'useful' ... is far more indebted to Utilitarian discourse ... than to medieval vocabulary..." (p.66)

British reform - mainly limited to madrasas established by British themselves, e.g. Calcutta Madrasa (founded 1781), although reforms were not consistent or coherent. The meaning of reform changed with the where and the when!
British ambivalence to reform because:

1. Uncertainties about 'usefulness' of Oriental learning;

2. Fear of a Muslim resentment, at least in part due to prestige even British madrasas enjoyed.

"...a spectrum of reformed, semireformed, and unreformed government madrasas, in addition to those that the government neither recognised nor supported, existed side by side, posing a constant challenge to the energies of the government committees periodically constituted to suggest ways to reform them." (p.68)

Reform and the 'Ulama in British India

Dars-i-Nizami - a corpus believed to have introduced to madrasa by Mulla Nizam al-din Muhammad (d.1748), although the list included many texts taught long before him and it continued to amended after he had died, probably only acquiring a standardized form in the latter half of the 19th century., although even this form was subject to local changes.

Deoband and subsequently all madrasas, emulated British educational approaches:

• fixed curriculum

• seperate classes for students of different levels

• defined academic year

• annual examinations

• networks of affiliated schools

Deoband curriculum included new emphasis on hadith as well as Dars-i-Nizami, with the remaining primary concern being "...the conservation of the classical Islamic texts and sciences ... not textual innovation." (p.69)

Nadwat al-'Ulama'
Reformist school founded by Sayyid Muhammad Ali Mongiri in Lucknow in 1894 with the aim of training ulama who would promote 'traditional' religious knowledge using some Western learning. The school also sought connect students to the pan-Islamic community (e.g. though improved Arabic), and promote proselytization. Better  Arabic would also give improved access to adab. Certain classic Sufi texts were used to promote moral education. The diversity of its membership influenced future Muslim organizations and undertakings, e.g., the Khilafat movement.

Late 19th C. Movement's founders viewed, "...the revival of the Muslim community depending on infusing the ranks of the 'ulama with fresh vigour, and on broadening the scope of their activities and their role within the Muslim community." (p.69)
Wider influence limited, leading to founding of the Dar al-'Ulum)
Claimed to be 'purely' religious, i.e. apolitical, yet attacked other madrasas for being out of touch!.

"At issue in the enterprise of devising a new curriculum was nothing short of determining what an 'Islamic education' - and, by extension, 'Islam itself - signified, how to teach it, and how to make that education 'useful' to the Muslim community" (Zaman, 2002, p.71)

Nadwat al-'Ulama' curriculum etc looked as if it was conducive to British colonial reforming ideas, in that it promoted:

• moral instruction (believed by the British to be lacking in madrasa education);

• literature (adab);

• practical skills;

• being more 'in touch' (i.e. representative);

• Arabic - viewed as the 'classical language of Muslim India' by many British

Nevertheless, generally speaking, "the Nadwa's curriculum has continued to be very much under the shadow of the Dars-i-Nizami." (p.72) The idea of moving away from the ancient texts and discourses surrounding the Dars-i-Nizami created too much disquiet among the Indian 'ulema for Mongiri to gain broader consent to his reforms, some of whom viewed the changes as a threat to madrasa identity.

One of the most famous figures to emerge from Nadwa was Abu'l-Hasan Ali Nadwi (1914 -1999) who was a teacher there from 1934, becoming its Principal in 1961. In 1980, he was appointed as Chairman of Islamic Centre Oxford, UK. Works translated into English include, 'A Guidebook for Muslims' and 'Guidance from the Holy Quran'. Member of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) and the World Supreme Council of Mosques. "...at the time of his death in 1999, the most widely respected of the Indian 'ulama." (p.73)

Today: "In a Hindu-dominated state whose secular credentials were questioned by many Muslims long before the prominence of Hindu nationalism, madrasas are seen by many Muslims as a guarantee of the preservation of their religious and cultural identity." (p.74)

Madrasa Reform in Pakistan

Part of Calcutta madrasa went to Dhaka on partition (then in East Pakistan).
Some migration of scholars from India.

In Pakistan; "The modern school system has everywhere come to dominate education, yet the madrasas have not only survived but shown a quite remarkable growth during the more than half-century of Pakistan's existence." (p.75)

Three eras of reform, but Zaman focuses on the first two:

• early 1960s

• late 1970s

• 2000+ (Musharraf)

Reports by committees of government wonks plus some 'ulama 1962 and 1979.
1962 report continues to expound similar categories of religious/non-religious and 'useful' as during colonialism.

"...the independence of the madrasas and the authority of its 'ulama  seemed to be called into question or, at least. to be reshaped in ways that are not of the 'ulama's choosing." (p.78)

Reform and Religious Authority

Mawlana Muhammad Yusuf Ludhianawi (d.2000)
"strident" in his response of the report of 1979, arguing that "...to integrate madrasas into this educational system could only mean destroying Islam itself." (p.79), effectively achieving what the British colonial administration failed to do in India! One argument since central to debates is the idea that any attempts to reform madrasas that are "...perceived to threaten the identity and the authority of the 'ulama is by definition suspect."(p.79), including their sectarian identity.

Other key figures in the debates:
Mufti Jamil Ahmad Thanawi (d.1995)
Muhammad Taqi 'Uthmani (vice president of Karachi Dar al-'Ulum)

"However they are understood, 'purely religious studies' occupy an exclusive space even within the madrassa. Rather than mitigating this sense of exclusivity, the presence of new elements from the government school system serves, ironically, to reinforce it." (p.83)

The 'Ulama's Religious Space

'Ulama writing on the question of madrasas insist that, "...the debate on the madrasa is a debate on the status and future of Islam itself" (p.84) Notion of madrasa = college of specialist study = hoped for outcome of preventing state encroachment.  'Ulama as religious experts "a significantly novel formulation" (p.85)

But see Berkey (1992); Chamberlain (1994) on how this perception of Islamic knowledge is probably quite recent.
E.g. Berkey shows "...that in medieval Cairo, no firm barriers existed between education and religious devotion." (p.85)

Laments of declining status of religious studies and 'ulama "...a familiar topos in Muslim literature..." (p.85), yet unlike Morocco, "...as described by Dale Eickelman, the ranks of the madrasa educated scholars are anything but diminished in Pakistan." (p.85) - e.g. number of madrasas substantially increased. Similarly, predictions about the decline of al-Azhar have proved premature, where prominence is linked to changes in curriculum since the 1960s.

"...the very effort to preserve Islam 'unchanged' in a rapidly changing world involves considerable redefinition of what Islam means, where to locate it in society, and how best to serve its interests." (p.86)

Chapter 4: Conceptions of the Islamic State

Chapter exploring concept of the Islamic state among contemporary Ulema, and how it compares/competes with other visions of the same.

The 'ulema "often speak of their religious sphere" (p.87) in terms that suggest it is a temporary haven of Sunna waiting for the rest of the nation/world to catch up, i.e. until an Islamic state comes about -- an important factor in tensions between madrasas and the state (?in Pakistan).

The Ambiguities of the Islamic State

Ulema -vs- Modernizing Elite- major theme in Pakistani politics

Constituent Assembly of Pakistan
Objective Resolution (1949):
"...sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to God Almighty alone, and the authority which He has delegated to the State of Pakistan through its people for being exercised within the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred trust..." (p.88)
Teachings/requirements pertinent thereto = Qur'an and Sunnah
Objective Resolution only part of Preamble in constitutions 1956, 1962, 1973, i.e. not integral/enforceable, defining only the intent rather than 'substantive provisions'.

Repugnancy clause - no law can be enacted that is 'repugnant' to the Qur'an/Sunnah - application of this clause eventually entrusted to the Council of Islamic Ideology, an advisory body staffed by both ulema and "others from a largely secular background" (p89).

General Zia al-Haqq (president: 1977-88)
Derived political legitimacy from major program of "Islamization", although Shari'at Court dominated by modernist judges, and ultimate authority still remained with the High Courts "...which were even more distant from the 'ulama" (p.89).

Benazir Bhutto
Her government had "little taste" (p.89) for Zia al-Haqq's policies of Islamization.

Nawaz Sharif
Leader of Pakistan Muslim League and "...a protege of Zia al-Haqq..." (p.90)
Shari'ah Act 1991 "...intended more for political effect than to bring about any real change..." (p.90)

"The Islamizing initiatives of Zia al-Haqq and Nawaz Sharif gave an unprecedented salience to the position of Islam in public life and the national discourse..." but ultimately "... the state remained suspicious of the 'ulama, as indeed they of it."(p.91)
Islamization initiatives controlled by modernizers and "...professions of an Islamic commitment on the part of the modernizing ruling elite have, paradoxically, increased the 'ulama's ambivalence towards the state..." (p.93)

Implementing Islamic Law

Twenty-two point declaration of 1951 by the Pakistan 'ulama --
repeatedly invoked by the 'ulama "...in elaborating on their conception of an Islamic state..." (p.94)
Islamic state rationale for creation of Pakistan, according to the 'ulama.
The question is not whether, but how.

Mawlana Taqi Usmani/'Uthmani:

"To attribute ... grassroots activism [since the 1980s] merely to the bankruptcy of Islamism [as per Roy, 1994] is not only to take too restricted a view of Islamism itself .. it is also to misunderstanding the many different expressions of this activism, the complexity of the context in which it has emerged, and once again, to ignore the 'ulama as part of this larger context." (p.111)

Chapter explores role of 'ulama in radicalization of Sunni and Shi'a identifies.

Aspects of a Sectarian Discourse

Shi'a vs Sunni: probably around 15% of Pakistani Muslims are Shi'a (p.113)
Ahmadis -- many anti-Shi'a Sunnis (i.e. members of Sipah-i-Sahaba) started life as Ahmadi-bashers

Catalysts
* Ahmadi issue helped raised and keep prominent the question of what constitutes a "real" Muslim;
* Wide-ranging Islamization initiated by Zia al-Haqq in 1979: "...the Shi'a saw the Islamization program of the late 1970s as an especially grave threat to their community interests..." (p.114)

Radicalized Identities: The Shi'a

Tahrik-i Nifaz-i Fiqh-i Ja'fariyya (TNFJ) [Movement for the Implementation of Ja'fari Law] - formed in 1980
Accusations of being part of Iranian goal to "export" revolution led to a name change:
Tahrik-i Ja'fariyya Pakistan [Movement of the Ja'fari-Shi'a of Pakistan] (TJP)
Founded by Mufti Ja'far Husayn (1916-83)
Succeeded by 'Allama 'Arif Husayn al-Husayni (1946-88)
TNFJ Manifesto 1987 all sects to be given effective representation of the Council of Islamic Ideology, rights to practice Muharram, call for a 'Popular Islamic Army'. etc

"The emergence of a noisy Shi'i organisation in Pakistan in the wake of the Iranian revolution caused considerable consternation to many Sunnis." (p.116) Sunnis challenged by implication of manifesto that Islam can have parallel and equally valid and officially recognised forms. Problem of hostility towards Prophet's (aws) companions, especially during Muharram (leading to riots) and fears over preaching, although much of that towards fellow Shi'a (Shaykhiyya/Shaykhís)

Shaykh Ahmad ibn Zayn ad-Dín ibn Ibráhím al-Ahsá'í (1753-1826) founder of a 19th century Shi'i school in the Persian and Ottoman empires, whose followers are known as Shaykhís.

TNFJ more moderate position after assassination of al-Husayni in 1988.
More militant: Sipah-i Muhammad Pakistan (Founded 1991) "...very much a young man's organisation" (p.118) -linked to anti-Sunni violence.
'Allama Sayyid Ghulam Riza Naqwi (b.1960)
"To Sunni radicals, the difference between TJP and Sipah-i Muhammad Pakistan is only one of strategy ... both are taken to stand for undermining Sunnism in Pakistan" (p.118)
Sipah-i Muhammad Pakistan comparable to Sunni organisations such as Sipah-i Sahaba

As well as Twelver Shi'a in Pakistan, also Isma'ilis and also Daudi Bohras

Blank, J. (2002) Mullahs on the Mainframe: Islam and Modernity Among the Daudi Bohras (University of Chicago Press)
Marsden, M. (2005) Living Islam: Muslim Religious Experience in Pakistan's North-West Frontier (Cambridge University Press)

Radicalized identities: The Sunnis

Sipah-i Sahaba (Founded 1985) -- offshoot of Jam'iyyat al-'Ulama'-i Islam, with the latter playing "...a considerable role in Pakistani electoral as well as agitational politics..." (p.119)
Founded by Mawlana Haqq Nawaz Jhangawi (1952-90)
Monthly journal: Khilafat-i Rashida

"The ignorance of "true" islam in the countryside remained a major theme of much reformist literature in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and no just in Deobandi discourse." (p.120 Rhetorical invocation of an 'original' Sunnism in their literature, equating Shi'ism with local custom. Local rural islam often a combo of Sunni/Shi'a/Sufi practices. Way of resisting Pirs' influence, who are rural magnates and adherents of Shi'ism.

"Imparting a sectarian identity is ... less a case of converting rural peasants to Sunnism from Shi'ism (or the reverse) and much more of confronting local practices with the Islam of the urban religious scholars and institutions." (p.120-1)

Seeks to have Shi'a declared non-Muslim minority and have Muharram processions outlawed.
Rashidun death anniversaries have national holidays.

"Even as an unmitigated hostility towards the Shi'a defines the stance of the Sipah-i Sahaba, its own symbolism shows unmistakable signs of Shi'i influence." (p.121) e.g. Companions venerated like Imams -- counterprocessions (which are in keeping with Catherine Bell's notion of the "invention of ritual"), evidence that it is often the allure of cultural Shi'ism rather than its radical variety that is a greater challenge to their efforts to propagate Sunni hegemony. Also similar conceptions of Islamic State to post-1979 Iran.

"...no event has created among radical Sunnis a greater sense of urgency to combat Shi'ism than the Iranian revolution." (p.123) whilst at the same time, the Iranian revolution asserted its presence in Pakistani communities through the "...massive production and dissemination of pro-Iranian and specifically Shi'i literature..." in Urdu. "To have such writings proscribed has remained a major concern of the Sipah-i Sahaba..." (p.123)

"'imaginary community' of sectarian Sunnism in Pakistan." (p.124)

Banned by Musharraf, along with a number of other radical sectarian groups.

Social and Economic Bases

"...a commercial (and, to a lesser extent, industrial) bourgeoisie is clearly the most important source of support upon which the Sipah-i Sahaba draws in Jhang and in other urban areas." (p.124)

Weiss, A. M. (1991) Culture, Class and Development: The Emergence of an Industrial bourgeoisie in Punjab (Westview)

"Shi'a probably include a greater proportion of the urban middle class than they do the Pakistani population as a whole ... Many urban middle class Shi'a profess to be 'secular', which is often as interpreted as there response to the perception that Islamization in an overwhelmingly Sunni country must mean the privileging of Sunni institutions over Shi'a." (p.125)

Sipah-i Sahaba appeal to interest of the 'common man' in the face of corrupt authority: e.g. pirs, rural magnates, urban administration.

Both Sunni and Shi'a urban religious leaders important in socialising recent arrivals from the countryside from the "tribal-rural milieu" (p.125) into town/city life.

In the 1970s and 1980s, Pakistanis working abroad paralleled a dramatic expansion in the middle class due to boosted income. This, along with the social dislocation accompanying such migrant work, have contributed to growth in sectarianism as rural Pakistanis returned and made homes in urban areas. Sectarian urban-religious identities one means of securing a middle class status and of forging new bonds and ties in a new environment..

"...the emergence of sectarian organizations dates to the same time as the return, in increasing numbers, of the labor migrants is not fortuitous." (p.126)

Illustration of socioeconomic context of sectarian commitments:
career of one of the Sipah-i Sahaba's leadership, Mawlana Isar al-Qasimi (1964-91). See page 127f.

"For the Sipah-i Sahaba, as indeed for Shi'a organisations, violence from sectarian opponents only their perception of threat ... and hence their raison d'etre of 'safeguarding' often through violent retaliation their sectarian kin ... Sectarian violence has clearly exacted a heavy toll in the Punjab, but ... it is not limited to this province." (p.128)

Tambiah (1996) -- focalization and transvaluation as two processes for extending the scope of conflict.

"The sectarian community is supralocal even as it constantly reinforced by local conditions and grievances." (p.131)

Types of Religious Leadership

Most sectarian leaders belong to the "peripheral 'ulama", although they have powerful allies in their arguments with other groups. e.g. among Sunnis, Mawlana Manzur Nu'mani (d.1961), author of the bestselling, 'The Iranian Revolution, Imam Khumayni an Shi'ism'.
"Manzur Nu'mani was but one among several prominent religious scholars to urge on the sectarian foot soldiers and to lend his moral and polemical support to the peripheral 'ulama leading the charge." (p.132)

"The leading religious scholars do not say that the Shi'is should be killed ... But enough justification is thereby provided to the peripheral 'ulama and their operatives..." (p.133)

Zaman contests the thesis of Nasr that sectarian violence is the outcome of one Deobandi group trying to dominate the political/religious landscape:
Nasr, S. V. R. (2000) Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan Modern Asian Studies 34:1 p.139-80, especially 169-80
...although Deobandis are increasingly dominant over e.g. the Barelawis

"The activities and attitudes of the contemporary 'ulama are more accurately ranged along a broad spectrum of options and possibilities ... than they are fixed on mutually exclusive or dichotomous groupings" (p.134)

"That the 'ulama have been drawn to potentially radical options is a relatively new phenomenon, as is the radicalization of sectarian identities in Pakistan" (p.135)

Expanding Horizons - In and Outside Pakistan

"Just as the work of leading 'ulama offers justifications for the radical Sunnis to wage their struggles against the Shi'a, so too does that struggle expand the influence of the 'ulama in general." (p.136)

"With this expanding influence, acquired in the course of the struggle against the Shi'a (and before them, the Ahmadis), the Deobandi 'ulama have come to eclipse Barelwi forms of shrine-based religiosity within Sunnism. What is more, they have begun to 'dominate the Islamist discourse at the cost of such lay Islamist parties as the Jama'at-i  Islami' (Nasr, 2000, p.179)" (p.136)

"So far as Pakistan's Deobandi 'ulama are concerned, the past quarter century has seen an expansion of their influence not only within the country but also outside it. If sectarianism is the most expression of the former, the strange career of the Taliban in neighbouring Afghanistan is surely the most striking illustration of the latter." (p.136)

See: Rashid, A. (2001) Taliban: the Story of the Afghan Warlords (Pan Books)

"The Deobandi 'ulama were never unanimously euphoric about the Taliban, however." (p.139), although the Taliban helped to enhance the reputation of the 'ulama (being their teachers), even after the US-led invasion of Afghanistan.

"...in a number of predominantly Sunni societies ... the 'ulama have acquired a new prominence in recent decades..." (p.143)

Chapter 6: Religiopolitical Activism and the 'Ulama: Comparative Perspectives

No Sunni equivalent to Shi'i 19th century marja' al-taqlid which formed the basis of Khumayni's wilayat al-faqih. Nevertheless, in some nations, Sunni 'ulama
"..have come to play new and highly significant religiopolitical roles." (p.144)

The 'Ulama and the State in Egypt

Egypt: second-most populous on the African continent, most populated in the Middle East , with an estimated 75 million people. Approximately 80-90% of the population are Muslim and most of the remainder are Coptic Orthodox Christian.

Starrett, G. (1998) Putting Islam to Work: Education, Politics and Religious Transformations in Egypt (University of California Press)

Zeghal, M. (2007) 'The 'Recentering' of Religious Knowledge and Discourse: The Case of Al-Azhar in Twentieth Century Egypt', in Hefner, R. W. & Zaman, M. Q. [Eds.] (2006) Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim Education (Princeton University Press)

"The Egyptian ruling elite, like those in other Muslim societies, have long depended on the 'ulama for religious legitimacy. But, as elsewhere, they have often also made efforts to restrict the power of the 'ulama..." (p.145)

Ruling elites' influence over the 'ulama in modern times: 'reform' and 'regulation'
In Egypt, the outcome of reform was not what was intended by the elite.

President Nasser 1961: attempt to integrate 'ulama into "educational mainstream". - targetting specifically Al-Azhar, but this is difficult to compare to e.g. South Asia where no comparable single institution holds such religio-cultural sway.

"The loose organization of the Pakistani madrasas has stood them well in resisting government regulation" (p.150)

Facilitated interaction between 'ulama, particularly the peripheral 'ulama, and Islamists (there are close links)
The objectified conceptions of Islam via government schools had the "...unintended consequences of nourishing ... the Islamic trend or what others have characterized as Islamist movements." (p.145/6)

Egyptian political elite sought greater legitimacy through Al-Azhar, but "...even the support of the Azhar establishment came at a price..." for the subsequent dependence on Azhar by the Egyptian state has enabled the 'ulama to be considerable effective in authoritatively defining "...the perimeters of all that would be Islamically acceptable."(p.147)

• Case of Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd

• Majlis al-Dawla (court) ruling giving Azhar significant powers of censorship  -1994

"New forms of Islamist activism have also helped enhance the 'ulama's influence." (p.148)
Similar boost in middle classes
Wickham (1996): 'parallel Islamic sector': communities "...sustained by ties between the lower-middle-class (sha'bi) neighbourhoods and the university graduates, as well as by private mosques, private voluntary organisations, independent preachers, and the wide dissemination of Islamic literature." (p.148)
"...the significance of this parallel sector goes far beyond its being a mechanism for religious change at the grassroots: its institutions provide financial support to Islamist groups, and those associated with this sector influenced by its range of activities constitute recruiting grounds for these groups..." (p.149)
But the appeal of this sector is fundamentally religious rather than political.

"We need to give more credit ...[in Egypt and elsewhere] ... to the 'ulama themselves, to their efforts in the cause of what they take to be the imperatives of the Islamic tradition and what they regard as their own proper role in upholding those imperatives." (p.151)

The Saudi 'Ulama

Commonly referred to as Saudi Arabia, the  Kingdom of Saudi Arabia or KSA is the largest country of the Arabian Peninsula and is home to an estimated 27 million people, including about 5.5 million resident foreigners. The majority of the population adheres to an interpretation of Islam commonly known as Salafism or Wahhabism.

Shari'a politics - siyasa shar'iyya, whereby the ruler's legal authority complemented that of the jurists'.

"Premodern 'ulama and rulers have typically competed with each others as to how this relationship of fiqh and siyasa  would be defined, how each would affect the scope of the other ... the ruler was the dominant partner in the Ottoman legal system; in the modern Saudi one ... it is the 'ulama who have the defining role." (p.152)

See: Vogel, Frank E. (2000) Islamic Law and Legal System: Studies of Saudi Arabia (Leiden: Brill)

University of Medina

• 10 000 graduates by 1997

• Allocates 85% of its places to non-Saudis

E.g. Safar al-Hawali, a Saudi scholar who received his doctorate from Umm al-Qura University, Mecca (1986). During the 1990s, he was arrested by the Saudi authorities for his criticism of the government after his sermons inciting militants to overthrow the government were distributed on cassette tapes.

"...an illustration of ... a broad trend of religious criticism that emerged in the Saudi kingdom in the wake of the [1991] Gulf War..." moreover, a specifically religious (rather simply polemical political) critique, and "...a demand for the 'true' implementation of the shari'a only underscores the power of the 'ulama to set - and continually reset - the terms of religious and political discourse in states that draw all or most of their legitimacy from public appeals to Islam..." (p.159)

Close links between peripheral ulama and Islamists.

The Indian 'Ulama

India's estimated population of 1.13 billion makes it the world's second most populous country. Almost 70% reside in rural areas, although migration to larger cities in recent decades has led to a dramatic increase in urban population. Over 80%  of Indians are Hindu, with Muslims at 13.4% and Tribals at 8.1%. Other groups (each less than 3% of the total population) include Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Jews, Zoroastrians and Baha'is.

See: Metcalf, B. (2006) 'Madrasas and Minorities in Secular India', in Hefner, R. W. & Zaman, M. Q. [Eds.] (2006) Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim Education (Princeton University Press)

Post-1947 Indian state recognised distinct Muslim community and the 'ulama's (educational and morally persuasive) leadership role. Since independence, "...the 'ulama have continued to energetically expand the reach of their educational institutions" (p.160)

Notable figures: Sayyid Abu'l-Hassan 'Ali Nadwi (d.1999). Most notable publication, 'What Has the World Lost with the Decline of the Muslims' - Trans by M  A Kidwai

Secular modernists accuse Muslim leadership of fuelling rise of Hindu nationalism - Zaman rejects this as simplistic.

All Indian Muslim Personal Law Board (established 1973)
April 1985 - Shah Bano, a 62 year old Muslim woman, whose names is synonymous with a divorce lawsuit which led the majority Rajiv Gandhi government to pass the 1986 Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, which not only diluted the secular judgment of the Indian Supreme Court but also denied the destitute Muslim divorcees the right to alimony from their former husbands.

Interpreting 'Ulama Activism  

"The religiopolitical activism of the 'ulama ... can only be understood in the specific contexts in which it has been articulated..." (p.170), but in the latter part of the 20th century, there are three common factors  through which 'ulama activism might be understood:

* the ties with the Islamists;
* international patronage;
* (more speculatively) the impact of the Iranian revolution.

1. The Islamists and the 'Ulama.

"The relations between the 'ulama and the Islamists vary not only from one society to another but also, in some cases, from one group of Islamists, or 'ulama, to another. But almost everywhere there is considerable interaction between the two." (p.170)
Close links between peripheral 'ulama and Islamists: Egypt, Saudi.
Pakistani: Deobandis more ambivalent towards Islamists, e.g. difficult relationship to Mawdudi.

Not simply a matter of madrasa and 'secular' graduates working together - increasingly, individuals are emerging with both forms of education, together facilitating "...an exchange and cross-fertilization of ideas..." (p.171)

Similarly, not always clear separation of peripheral/core 'ulama.

"...some of the challenges to which the 'ulama and the Islamists have responded are similar..." (p.171) e.g. the failed promises of liberal, nationalist and socialist ideologies, Western rationalism's claims to epistemological pervasiveness, and the encroachment of the modern nation state particularly on matters of religion, disenchantment of modernity, of which there are detractors within the West e.g. Alasdair MacIntyre.

Yet the 'ulama usually have an advantage in relation to the state that the Islamists do not.

2. International Patronage

Saudi (both state and Saudi organisations) is the obvious biggy here, but see also relationship between Al-Azhar and the new Philippine ustadzes ('ulama)

3. The Impact of Iran

"The impact of the Iranian revolution is not enough to explain the radicalization of sectarian identities in Pakistan, and yet neither the reassertion of the Shi'a nor the Sunni reaction it provoked is conceivable without this." (p.177)

Rethinking Muslim Politics (with the 'Ulama in It) 

Exploring the contemporary activism of the 'ulama reveals a complexity in Muslim politics, in which the 'ulama continue to play a critical albeit varied and multifaceted role. Despite the fragmentation of contemporary religious authority, it is distorting to focus too much attention on Islamists in Muslim politics, to the relative exclusion of the 'ulama whose role is arguably expanding.

"The activism of the 'ulama points to the political resonance of the Islamic religious tradition..." which is not reducible to other factors. Indeed, "...the appeal of the 'ulama is ... grounded in their guardianship of the religious tradition as continuous, lived heritage that connects the past and the present..." (p.180)

Power of the 'ulama is that their discourses incorporate modern themes of:

IDENTITY * CULTURAL AUTHENTICITY * RELIGIOUS AUTHENTICITY

"...in the context of the new salience of religion in public life in the last decades of the twentieth century, it is precisely their claims to authoritatively represent an 'authentic' Islamic tradition in its richness, depth, and continuity that may have become the most significant basis of their new prominence in the public sphere." (p.180)

Epilogue: The 'Ulama in the Twenty-First Century 

Discussion of internal criticisms of 'ulama, drawing on a 1992 speech made by Mawlana Wahid al-din Khan (b. 1925).

Wahid al-din Khan argued that "...tolerance for criticism, which is the precondition for intellectual endeavours such as ijtihad. has declined..." and larger change by the 'ulama because instead of understanding change as part of historical evolution, it has been viewed in terms of conspiracies
"...which have to be uncovered and resisted..." (p.182)

Safeguard against incompetent ijtihad is that "God and truth alone thrives in this world and falsehood soon perishes by itself." (Khan, Fikr-i Islami, 1996, p.39)

Intellectual heritage of Islam product of time when Muslims were political dominant.

Wahid al-din Khan  recommends a "...patient, apolitical proselytism..." (pg.183), leading him to be labelled rather unfairly as the 'BJP Maulana'.

"...he remains highly critical of the 'ulama -- not of those belonging to this or that sectarian orientation, but of the 'ulama as a whole." (p.185)

"A wholehearted recognition that the tradition requires major changes and that the 'ulama ought to set themselves on the path of bringing about about has been rare. yet the lack of such acknowledgement ... has not precluded changes of varying significance..." (p.186)

Picture of change sometimes complex/subtle:

Taqlid not necessarily rigid -- see Bruinessen (1996)
The use of strategic methods by 'ulama -- see Mir-Hosseini (1999)

Plus  degree of understanding of contemporary Islam and its issues among 'ulama often underestimated.

"...the 'ulama's insistence on maintaining a continuous link with this tradition is ... the basis of their religious and political roles in contemporary Islam." (p.189)

Modernists - Islam needs to be phrased in the idiom of the modern age.
Counter to this (although referring to Christianity), see Goerge Lindbeck (1984)
Lindbeck: "Instead of redescribing the faith in new concepts, it seeks to teach the language and practices of the religion to potential adherents." (p.190)

Despite claiming to resist change, they continue to:

* Enlarge their audience;
* Shape the debates on the meaning of Islam in public life;
* Lead activist movements.

Multiple approaches "...guided by a broadly shared way of looking at the world, at themselves and, above all, at the Islamic tradition of which they profess to be both the custodians and the authoritative interpreters..." (p.191)

11 July 2008

the pen/index